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Florida Constitutional Law-HOMESTEAD TAX EXEMP-
TION-ALL RESIDENT HOMEOWNERS IN FLORIDA ARE TO RECEIVE THE
ENHANCED EXEMPTION,-Osterndorf v. Turner, 7 Fla. L.W. 553
(December 16, 1982)
I. INTRODUCTION
On December 16, 1982, the Supreme Court of Florida ruled that
section 196.031(3)(e), Florida Statutes, which grants an enhanced
homestead exemption of $25,000 to homeowners who have been
Florida residents for five consecutive years immediately prior to
claiming the exemption, violates the equal protection clause of the
Florida Constitution. In Osterndorf v. Turner,1 the court excised
the statutory language which required a homeowner to have been a
resident for five years before qualifying for the enhanced exemp-
tion.' The court's decision will enable approximately 361,000 resi-
dents statewide to qualify for the enhanced $25,000 exemption
which had previously been denied to them.3 However, the impact
of the decision will reach beyond these residents. Initial estimates
suggest that $119 million per year will be lost in tax revenues
statewide.4 To make up for these lost revenues, many cities and
counties may have to increase their millage rates, thereby increas-
ing the taxes assessed to all residents in the state. 5 In addition, the
decision may have some serious implications for several other Flor-
ida homestead exemption statutes containing similar durational
residency requirements.' The Osterndorf decision may eventually
result in these other homestead tax exemption statutes being de-
clared unconstitutional, thereby indirectly affecting even more
Florida taxpayers.
Florida grants to every person who has legal or equitable title in
the real property in which they live an "exemption from all taxa-
1. 7 Fla. L.W. 553 (Dec. 16, 1982).
2. Section 196.031(3)(e), Florida Statutes, states:
For every person who is entitled to the exemption provided in subsection (1) and
who has been a permanent resident of this state for the 5 consecutive years prior
to claiming the exemption under this subsection, the exemption is increased to a
total of the following amounts of assessed valuation for levies of taxing authorities
other than school districts: . . .$25,000 with respect to assessments for 1982 and
each year thereafter.
The Osterndorf court excised "for the 5 consecutive years prior to claiming the exemption
under this subsection" from the statute. Osterndorf, 7 Fla. L.W. at 556. See infra note 15
and accompanying text.
3. Miami Herald, Dec. 17, 1982, at IA, col. 6.
4. Id.
5. Id. See also St. Petersburg Times, Dec. 17, 1982, at 1A, col. 1.
6. See infra notes 8, 10, 11 and accompanying text.
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tion, except for assessments for special benefits, up to the assessed
valuation of $5,000 on the . . . residence."7 This exemption has
been increased to $25,000 for those persons who have been contin-
uous residents of the state for five years. The "enhanced" home-
stead exemption applies to the taxes levied by the governing bod-
ies of school districts8 and to other taxing authorities in the state."
In addition, Florida law gives an enhanced homestead exemption
of $10,000 to homeowners over the age of sixty-five who have been
continuous residents of the state for the five years prior to claiming
the exemption.10 An enhanced exemption of $9,500 is given to
homeowners who are totally and permanently disabled and have
been continuous residents of the state for five years.1' The court in
Osterndorf limited the scope of its decision to section
196.031(3)(e), which gives the above-mentioned $25,000 exemption
7. FLA. STAT. § 196.031(l) (Supp. 1982). Florida is not the only state which grants a
homestead tax exemption to all resident homeowners. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 40-9-19 (1975);
CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 218 (West 1970); GA. CODE ANN. § 48-5-44 (1982); HAWAII REV.
STAT. § 246-26 (1976); Miss. CODE ANN. § 27-33-3 (1972); TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 7150.5
(Vernon 1982).
8. FLA. STAT. § 196.031(3)(d) (Supp. 1982). Subsequent to the December 16, 1982, opin-
ion, petitioner Osterndorf filed a motion for rehearing/clarification requesting the court to
consider the constitutionality of § 196.031(3)(a), (b), (d), Florida Statutes. The state also
filed a motion for rehearing requesting the court to reverse its previous decision and to
declare the durational residency requirement constitutional. On February 3, 1983, the court
clarified its December 16, 1982, opinion by declaring § 196.031(3)(d) unconstitutional. The
court reasoned that subsection (3)(d) clearly had been placed in issue by petitioner Os-
terndorf's pleadings in the trial court and the appellate court, and therefore could properly
be considered upon review by the supreme court. The court also stated that there was "ab-
solutely no basis for distinguishing subsection (3)(d) from subsection (3)(e)" because the
wording and the related constitutional provisions of the two subsections were nearly identi-
cal. Osterndorf v. Turner, 8 Fla. L.W. 58 (Feb. 3, 1983). Because subsection (3)(d) was indis-
tinguishable from subsection (3)(e), the court declared subsection (3)(d) unconstitutional for
the same reasons it had expressed in its December 16, 1982, opinion. Id.
9. FLA. STAT. § 196.031(3)(e) (Supp. 1982). No other state grants an enhanced tax ex-
emption to residents based solely upon the duration of residence in the state.
10. FLA. STAT. § 196.031(3)(a) (Supp. 1982). In addition to a general homestead exemp-
tion available to all residents, as Florida offers, several states also grant an enhanced exemp-
tion to residents over 65 years of age. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 40-9-19 (1975); TEX. STAT. ANN.
art. 7150.5 (Vernon 1982). Several other states, although they do not grant a general home-
stead exemption to all residents, do grant a general exemption for the elderly. See, e.g.,
ALASKA STAT. § 29.53.020(6)(e) (1978); Ky. REV. STAT. § 132.810 (Supp. 1982); N.Y. REAL
PROP. TAX LAW § 467 (McKinney 1972).
11. FLA. STAT. § 196.031(3)(b) (Supp. 1982). In addition to a general homestead exemp-
tion available to all residents, as Florida offers, several states also grant an enhanced exemp-
tion to disabled residents. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 40-9-19 (1975); HAwAii REV. STAT. § 246-31
(1976). A number of other states, although they do not grant a homestead exemption to all
residents, do give an exemption to those who are permanently disabled. See, e.g., ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 42-271(8) (1980); Ky. REV. STAT. § 132.810 (Supp. 1982); S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-
37-290 (Law. Co-op. 1976); W. VA. CODE § 11-6B-3 (Supp. 1982).
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from the levies of taxing authorities other than school districts. 2
A special election was held on October 5, 1980, in which the
Florida electorate approved an amendment to the state constitu-
tion.' 3 Because this amendment 4 was to be implemented by gen-
eral law, the Florida legislature enacted section 196.031(3)(e):
(e) For every person who is entitled to the exemption provided
in subsection (1) and who has been a resident of this state for the
5 consecutive years prior to claiming the exemption under this
subsection, the exemption is increased to a total of the following
amounts of assessed valuation for levies of taxing authorities
other than school districts: $15,000 with respect to 1980 assess-
ments; $20,000 with respect to 1981 assessments; and $25,000
with respect to assessments for 1982 and each year thereafter.' 5
Osterndorf v. Turner first arose in the Circuit Court of Volusia
County, when Richard and Pauline Osterndorf, who had resided
there for less than five years, challenged the five-year residency re-
quirement enabling a resident to qualify for the $25,000 exemption
granted by section 196.031(3)(e).' 6 The Osterndorfs contended that
the statute created an arbitrary, capricious and discriminatory
classification which violated their rights of equal protection and
due process under the federal and state constitutions. After the
pleadings were filed, both parties moved for summary judgment.
The trial court entered final summary judgment for defendant
12. Osterndorf, 7 Fla. L.W. at 556 n.4.
13. At the June 30, 1980, Special Session of the Florida Legislature, Senate Bill 3-E was
passed by the House and Senate creating Chapter 80-418, Laws of Florida. This bill pro-
vided for a special election on October 7, 1980, in which the Florida electorate would vote to
approve or reject an amendment to article VII, section 6, of the Florida Constitution. See
Ch. 80-418, 1980 Fla. Laws 1758. The amendment provided for increases in the tax exemp-
tion given on the assessed value of real estate for each levy other than those of school dis-
tricts. These exemptions were to increase from $5,000 to $15,000 in 1980, $20,000 in 1981
and $25,000 in 1982. See Fla. SJR 4-E (1980).
14. FLA. CONsT. art. VII, § 6(d), in pertinent part, reads as follows:
By general law and subject to conditions specified therein, the exemption shall be
increased to a total of the following amounts of assessed value of real estate for
each levy other than those of school districts: fifteen thousand dollars with respect
to 1980 assessments; twenty thousand dollars with respect to 1981 assessments;
twenty-five thousand dollars with respect to the assessments for 1982 and each
year thereafter.
15. FLA. STAT. § 196.031(3)(e). The Florida Legislature actually voted to approve this
statute, subject to the voters approval of the constitutional amendment, prior to the Octo-
ber 5, 1980, special election. See FLA. H.R. JOUR. 20 (Spec. Sess. June 9-11, 1980); FLA. S.
JOUR. 18 (Spec. Sess. June 9-11, 1980).
16. Osterndorf v. Turner, Case No. 81-260, CA-01 Division D (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1981).
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Turner, holding that section 196.031(3)(e) was constitutional. 17
The court reasoned that the right to receive an increased ad
valorem tax exemption was not a fundamental right s guaranteed
either explicitly or implicitly by the United States Constitution
nor was it a basic necessity of life."9 The court also stated that the
right to the exemption did not impose a significant penalty on the
right to travel.2 0 Therefore, the court applied a "rational basis,"
rather than a "compelling state interest," test.2" In the trial court,
the defendant had filed the affidavit of Representative Ralph
Haben in order to establish the legislative purposes for the stat-
ute.2 2 The trial court held that the legislative purpose of requiring
new residents to help offset their immediate fiscal impact upon lo-
cal government's capital outlay, while affording long term residents
the increased exemption due to their past tax payments, satisfied
the rational basis test.2 5
On appeal, the Osterndorfs asserted that the trial court erred in
applying the rational basis test rather than the stricter compelling
state interest standard.24 Appellants also asserted that article VII,
section 6, of the Florida Constitution did not authorize the crea-
tion of the five-year durational residency requirement found in sec-
tion 196.031(3)(e).2 ' The Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed
17. For a summary of the circuit court's decision, see Osterndorf v. Turner, 411 So. 2d
330, 332 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982).
18. For a discussion of various fundamental rights recognized by the United States Su-
preme Court, see L. Tamz, AMEmcAN CONsTrrTIONAL LAW § 16-7-12, at 1002-11 (1978).
19. Osterndorf, 411 So. 2d at 332.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 333. For a discussion of the application of the strict scrutiny test when funda-
mental rights are involved, see TamE, supra note 18, § 16-6, at 1000-02. For a discussion of
the application of the rational basis test, see Id. § 16-2, at 994-96.
22. "[Ralph Haben] was a member of the Florida Legislature and a member of the
House Committee on Taxation and Finance during all relevant times." Osterndorf, 411 So.
2d at 334 n.4. The Florida Supreme Court in Osterndorf summarized the contents of
Haben's affidavit listing the legislative purposes for the statute as follows:
(1) that new residents have an immediate fiscal impact upon local government's
capital outlay and should pay their own share of this tax burden; (2) that tax
savings should be passed on to longer term residents who have in recent years
contributed tax dollars that have created a revenue surplus and made the in-
creased tax exemption possible; (3) that the statute would discourage fraudulent
homestead exemption applications; and, (4) that the statute would avoid the
possibility of excessive immigration of individuals who desire lower taxes but are
in need of many governmental services if Florida became too much of a tax haven.
Osterndorf, 7 Fla. L.W. at 554.
23. Osterndorf, 411 So. 2d at 334.
24. Id. at 332.
25. Id. at 334.
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the trial court's decision, holding that the rational basis standard
was the proper test to be applied to this statute because the right
to an enhanced exemption was neither a fundamental right nor a
basic necessity of life.26 The appellate court also agreed with the
trial court that the legislative purposes for the statute satisfied the
rational basis test.27 In addition, the court ruled that section
196.031(3)(e) did not contravene the language or intent of article
VII, section 6, of the Florida Constitution. Recognizing the signif-
icant impact which upholding the statute might have on taxpayers
and taxing authorities throughout the state, the court certified the
following two questions to the Supreme Court of Florida: "(1)
Does section 196.031(3)(e), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1980), violate
the equal protection clause or the due process clause of either the
state or federal constitution? (2) Does section 196.031(3)(e), Flor-
ida Statutes (Supp. 1980), violate the provisions of article VII, sec-
tion 6, of the Constitution of Florida, as amended in 1980? ''12
The Florida Supreme Court answered both of these questions in
the affirmative and reversed the appellate court's decision.30 The
supreme court held section 196.031(3)(e) to be unconstitutional
under the equal protection clause of the Florida Constitution.31 In
addition, the court held that article VII, section 6(d), of the Flor-
ida Constitution did not give the legislature the authority to enact
a law which violates the equal protection clause of the Florida
Constitution. 2
II. THE Osterndorf DECISION
The majority opinion discussed several federal and state cases
26. Id. at 333.
27. Id. at 334.
28. Id.
29. Osterndorf, 7 Fla. L.W. at 553 (citation omitted).
30. Id.
31. Because the court limited its decision to Florida's equal protection clause, the court
did not have to address the statute's constitutionality under the equal protection clause of
the United States Constitution. Id. at 555.
32. Florida's equal protection clause is found at FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2 which provides:
Basic Rights. All natural persons are equal before the law and have inalienable
rights, among which are the right to enjoy and defend life and liberty, to pursue
happiness, to be rewarded for industry, and to acquire, possess and protect prop-
erty; except that the ownership, inheritance, disposition and possession of real
property by aliens ineligible for citizenship may be regulated or prohibited by law.
No person shall be deprived of any right because of race, religion or physical
handicap.
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involving statutes33 with durational residency requirements.3 4 The
court then gave its rationale for holding that section 196.031(3)(e)
was unconstitutional. Herein arises the difficulty with compre-
hending the court's opinion. The rationale given by the court does
not refer back to, nor does it cite specifically, any of the cases en-
compassed within its earlier general discussion of durational resi-
dency requirements. Upon close reading of the court's rationale, it
is apparent that the court borrowed from some of the reasoning
which was expressed in these federal and state cases. An analysis
of these cases will unveil the sources of much of the reasoning
which the court relied upon in its opinion.
A. The Rationale for the Court's Holding
Justice Overton, writing for the majority, stated that section
196.031(3)(e) established "two categories of permanent residents
for entitlement to homestead tax exemption." 35 The court recog-
nized that disparity of treatment by a state towards its citizens
with respect to taxes is not totally prohibited, but noted that there
must be a rational basis for such disparities to exist.36 In Os-
terndorf the state presented four "rational" bases for the five-year
residency requirement.3 7 The Osterndorf court ruled, however, that
33. None of these cases involved a statute fashioned like section 196.031(3)(e), granting
an enhanced homestead exemption based solely on the length of residency in the state. In-
deed, no other state has such a statute. See supra note 9. The court's discussion of these
cases provided an appropriate comparison of how other courts have dealt with statutory
durational residency requirements.
34. A durational residency requirement is a statutorily required period of residency that
an otherwise bona fide resident must satisfy before becoming eligible to qualify for certain
state benefits.
35. Osterndorf, 7 Fla. L.W. at 555.
36. Id. The court cited Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974), as authority for this pro-
position. In Kahn the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a Florida statute
granting a $500 property tax exemption to "widows." The statute was challenged by a wid-
ower who had been denied the exemption because the statute was limited expressly to wid-
ows. The Supreme Court held that a state tax law is not arbitrary even if it discriminates in
favor of a certain class, as long as the discrimination is "founded upon a reasonable distinc-
tion." Id. at 355 (quoting Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 528 (1959)).
Indeed, the Supreme Court has generally given the state legislatures great leeway regard-
ing tax classifications. "Where taxation is concerned and no specific federal right, apart from
equal protection, is imperilled, the States have large leeway in making classifications and
drawing lines which in their judgment produce reasonable systems of taxation." Lehnhausen
v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 359 (1973) (footnote omitted). The Florida
Supreme Court has recognized that tax burdens may be "unequal" and that equal protec-
tion does not mean "identity of treatment" regarding taxes, as long as the disparity of treat-
ment is not "wholly arbitrary." State v. Andersen, 208 So. 2d 814, 820 (Fla. 1968).
37. See supra note 22.
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there "is no rational basis for distinguishing between bona fide res-
idents of more than five consecutive years and bona fide residents
of less than five consecutive years in payment of taxes on their
homes. ' 38 The court gave the following reasons why each of the
four bases offered by the state, and expressed in Ralph Haben's
affidavit, failed the rational basis test:
First, it is constitutionally prohibited for this state to impose dif-
ferent taxes on its citizens based solely on their length of perma-
nent residence in the state. Second, it is not a legitimate state
purpose to reward certain citizens for past contributions to the
detriment of other citizens. Third, we find five years is an unrea-
sonable period of time to establish bona fide residency and is un-
necessary to discourage fraudulent homestead exemption applica-
tions. Fourth, the avoidance of possible or excessive immigration
of individuals to this state is clearly not constitutionally
permissible."
The supreme court failed to explain in any detail, or to cite di-
rectly any authority for, these four reasons. This absence of an ad-
equate explanation and supporting authority is the major obstacle
to understanding the court's opinion. However, an independent ex-
amination of several United States Supreme Court cases, which
the Osterndorf court discussed only briefly, reveals the sources
from which these four reasons were derived.
B. Discussion of the Durational Residency Requirement Cases
The Osterndorf court began its discussion of several cases ad-
dressing the durational residency issue by citing Shapiro v.
Thompson.40 In Shapiro, the United States Supreme Court heard
three appeals challenging state and District of Columbia statutes
which denied welfare assistance to residents who had not resided
within the states or District for at least a year immediately
preceeding application for assistance.4" In each of these cases, the
states or the District of Columbia attempted to justify the one-year
requirement "as a protective device used to preserve the fiscal in-
tegrity of state public assistance programs.""' Another argument
38. Osterndorf, 7 Fla. L.W. at 555.
39. Id.
40. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
41. These statutes are cited in pertinent part at Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 622 n.2, 624 n.3,
626 n.5.
42. Id. at 627.
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offered for the one-year requirement was that it discouraged indi-
gents from entering the state solely to obtain higher benefits.4" The
final justification given for the requirement was that it was an "at-
tempt to distinguish between new and old residents on the basis of
the contribution they have made to the community through the
payment of taxes."44
Because the statutory classifications in Shapiro denied welfare
assistance to individuals who had not resided in the state for one
year, the fundamental right of interstate travel was affected.4 . The
Shapiro Court decided that when such a fundamental right was
infringed, a "compelling state interest" test must be applied."' The
Court held that each of the justifications put forth to support the
one-year residency requirement failed to pass this exacting stan-
dard. The Court stated that it was "constitutionally impermissi-
ble" for the state to attempt to prohibit immigration of indigents
into the state.47 In addition, the Court ruled that a state could not
seek to fence out indigents simply because they were seeking
higher benefits.4 Finally, the Supreme Court thoroughly rejected
the attempted use of the one-year residency requirement to distin-
guish between old and new residents on the basis of their contribu-
tions to the community through the payment of taxes. The ration-
ale for the Court's position on this last issue was that the reasoning
behind such a justification would logically permit a state to appor-
tion all benefits and services according to the past contributions of
its citizens.49 Such an apportionment of state benefits and services
43. Id. at 631.
44. Id. at 632.
45. Id. at 629-630. For a discussion of the fundamental right to travel from one state to
another, see United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-59 (1966).
46. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 638. The traditional equal protection standard inquired whether
a classification was "without any reasonable basis." Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.,
220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911). For a discussion of the various tests used in equal protection analy-
sis, see generally the cases cited at Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335 n.6 (1972).
47. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 631. The Court reasoned that "[i]f a law has 'no other purpose
.. than to chill the assertion of constitutional rights by penalizing those who choose to
exercise them, then it [is] patently unconstitutional.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Jack-
son, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968)).
48. Id. The Court was particularly concerned about instances in which indigents seek
out benefits in other states in hopes of making a "new life" for themselves. The Court did
not believe that such indigents, who seek to improve their position in life, ought to be re-
garded as "less deserving" than those indigents who enter a state without taking into con-
sideration a state's benefits. Id. at 631-32.
49. The Shapiro Court said:
Appellants' reasoning would logically permit the State to bar new residents from
schools, parks, and libraries or deprive them of police and fire protection. Indeed
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would contravene the equal protection clause.
The Osterndorf court relied upon Shapiro in ruling that the jus-
tifications offered by the state for the statutory residency require-
ment lacked a rational basis. In fact, the court used language al-
most identical to that used in Shapiro to reject the state's
reduction of immigration argument. For instance, the Osterndorf
court stated that it was not "constitutionally permissible" for the
state to try to reduce immigration of people into the state.50 The
Osterndorf court also held that the five-year residency requirement
was an unreasonable period of time to establish bona fide resi-
dency and was unnecessary to discourage fraudulent homestead
exemption applications.5 1 The Shapiro Court similarly had ruled
that the one-year residency requirement was an unreasonable
means of safeguarding against fraudulent welfare claims because a
less drastic alternative could have been employed to achieve the
same results.52 In addition, the Osterndorf court stated that it was
not a legitimate state purpose to reward certain citizens for past
tax contributions.53 In adopting this reasoning, the Osterndorf
court cited a passage from Shapiro which expressed the Supreme
Court's concern that a state might attempt to apportion other ben-
efits based upon past tax contributions.5
Another case which the court in Osterndorf cited in its discus-
sion of durational residency requirements was Dunn v. Blumstein.
In that case, a Tennessee resident challenged a state statute which
required residency in the state for one year, and in a particular
county for three months, as a prerequisite to voter registration."
The Court in Dunn stated that since the right to vote was a funda-
mental right,5" and because the one-year requirement impinged on
it would permit the State to apportion all benefits and services according to the
past tax contributions of its citizens. The Equal Protection Clause prohibits such
an apportionment of state services.
Id. at 632-33.
50. Osterndorf, 7 Fla. L.W. at 555.
51. Id.
52. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 637. The Court stated that the problem of double payment of
welfare benefits could be safeguarded against by "cooperation among state welfare depart-
ments." Id.
53. Osterndorf, 7 Fla. L.W. at 555.
54. Id. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
55. The Tennessee statute which was challenged in Dunn can be found in pertinent part
at Dunn, 405 U.S. at 332 n.1.
56. Dunn, 405 U.S. at 336. For discussion of the right to vote as a fundamental right, see
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-562 (1964); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370
(1886).
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the right to travel, 7 a compelling state interest test should be
applied.
The Court in Dunn emphasized the difference between bona fide
residency requirements and durational residency requirements."
The state of Tennessee asserted that one purpose for the one-year
requirement was that it established an effective means of ascer-
taining bona fide residency.5 9 Tennessee also asserted that the resi-
dency requirement helped assure that the state would have knowl-
edgeable voters.60 However, the Court rejected both of these
purposes because neither furthered a compelling state interest.6 1
The Dunn Court reasoned that the one-year residency requirement
was not a proper means of determining bona fide residency be-
cause the requirement was "too imprecise" and thereby excluded
residents as well as nonresidents.2 The Court noted that the state
was properly concerned about establishing bona fide residency in
order to avoid fraudulent voting practices. However, the Court felt
that there were better means available in order to avoid fraud."
For instance, the Court pointed out that the state could use crimi-
nal penalties to deter voter fraud."
The Osterndorf court took note of the distinction made by the
Dunn Court between bona fide and durational residency require-
ments. 5 Indeed, the court in Osterndorf picked up on the Dunn
Court's holding that the one-year residency requirement could not
be justified as a way of establishing bona fide residency. In Os-
terndorf, the state had argued that the five-year requirement was
an effective way of establishing bona fide residency and thereby
avoiding fraudulent claims.6 However, the majority in Osterndorf
ruled that "five years is an unreasonable period of time to establish
bona fide residency." 67 Similar to the Court in Dunn, 8 the Os-
57. Dunn, 405 U.S. at 338. For a discussion of the right to travel, see supra note 45.
58. Dunn, 405 U.S. at 343-344. For a description of a durational residency requirement,
see supra note 34.
59. Dunn, 405 U.S. at 349.
60. Id. at 356.
61. Id. at 360.
62. Id. at 351.
63. Id. at 353.
64. Id. Additionally, the residency requirement failed because of its "crudeness as a de-
vice for achieving the articulated state goal of assuring the knowledgeable exercise" of the
right to vote. Id. at 357-58.
65. Osterndorf, 7 Fla. L.W. at 554-55. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
66. See supra note 22.
67. Osterndorf, 7 Fla. L.W. at 555.
68. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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terndorf court believed that the five-year period was "unnecessary
to discourage fraudulent homestead exemption applications.' 69
In another case cited by the Osterndorf majority, Memorial Hos-
pital v. Maricopa County,70 the Supreme Court struck down an
Arizona statute requiring one year's residency in a county as a con-
dition to an indigent's receiving free nonemergency medical care.
In that case, the county asserted several justifications for the one-
year residency requirement. The first reason was that the require-
ment was intended to "insure the fiscal integrity" of the county's
free medical care program.7 1 Second, the one-year requirement at-
tempted to inhibit the immigration of indigents into the state.7 2
Third, the requirement sought to protect the state's longtime resi-
dents who had made past contributions to the community.73 The
fourth reason offered for the requirement was that it facilitated the
determination of bona fide residency, and thereby discouraged
fraud.7' The Supreme Court rejected each of these asserted
justifications.
Some of the Court's reasons in Memorial Hospital for rejecting
the justifications put forth by the state were pertinent to the Os-
terndorf decision. The Court in Memorial Hospital ruled that any
attempt to prohibit immigration into the state was "constitution-
ally impermissible. ' ' 75 The Osterndorf court similarly employed
this reasoning by ruling that the attempt to avoid immigration of
individuals into the state was "clearly not constitutionally permis-
sible. 117  The Memorial Hospital Court. also ruled that a state
could not protect its longtime residents because of their past tax
contributions to the community.77 This reasoning was adopted in
the Osterndorf court's statement that "it is not a legitimate state
purpose to reward certain citizens for past contributions to the
detriment of other citizens. 7 8 In Memorial Hospital, the Court re-
jected the use of the "one-year waiting period . .. [as] a conve-
nient rule of thumb to determine bona fide residence."' 9 In addi-
69. Osterndorf, 7 Fla. L.W. at 555.
70. 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
71. Id. at 263.
72. Id. at 263-64.
73. Id. at 266.
74. Id. at 268.
75. Id. at 263-64.
76. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
77. Memorial Hospital, 415 U.S. at 266.
78. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
79. Memorial Hospital, 415 U.S. at 267.
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tion, the Court rejected the one-year requirement as a means of
preventing fraud.80 The Osterndorf court followed this reasoning
by ruling that five years was an "unreasonable period of time to
establish bona fide residency" and was "unnecessary to discourage
fraudulent homestead exemption applications.""
The foregoing analysis of Shapiro, Dunn, and Memorial Hospi-
tal is helpful in revealing the source of some of the court's reason-
ing in Osterndorf. However, this analysis also raises an important
question. In Shapiro, Dunn, and Memorial Hospital, the Supreme
Court found that the durational residency requirements in issue
denied residents either a fundamental right or a basic necessity of
life. For this reason, the Court applied a "compelling state inter-
est" test in evaluating the constitutionality of these durational
residency requirements. The question then naturally arises
whether the testing of a durational residency requirement would
result in a similar outcome to that enumerated in Shapiro, Dunn,
and Memorial Hospital when neither a fundamental right nor a
basic necessity of life is at stake. Perhaps for this very reason, the
court in Osterndorf cited Sosna v. Iowa82 in its discussion of dura-
tional residency requirements.
In Sosna, the Supreme Court upheld an Iowa statute 3 requiring
one year's residency before a person could receive a divorce in the
state. The appellants in Sosna asserted that the one-year residency
requirement was unconstitutional because it established two clas-
ses of persons within the state and discriminated against those who
had recently exercised their right to travel."' The Supreme Court
rejected these assertions, holding that a state has a significant in-
terest in requiring that those seeking a divorce from its courts be
"genuinely attached to the State. 8 5 The Court reasoned that the
Iowa residency requirement assured such genuine attachment,
thereby providing a more "reasonable" ground than the "budget-
ary considerations" or "administrative convenience" which were of
concern in Shapiro, Dunn, and Memorial Hospital." Although not
80. Id. at 268.
81. Osterndorf, 7 Fla. L.W. at 555. See supra notes 67, 69 and accompanying text.
82. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
83. The Iowa statute can be found in pertinent part at Id. at 395 n.1.
84. Id. at 405.
85. Id. at 409.
86. Id. at 406. This characterization by the Sosna Court, in attempting to distinguish the
Iowa statute from the statutes considered in Shapiro, Dunn, and Memorial Hospital, may
not have been completely accurate in stating the justifications given for the statutes in those
cases. See supra notes 42-44, 59, 60, 71-74 and accompanying text.
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expressly stated in the opinion, the Court apparently applied the
rational basis test. The Court also noted that a state has an inter-
est in protecting its divorce decrees from collateral attack.87 In this
way, the Court in Sosna applied a different test and arrived at a
different result than it had in Shapiro, Dunn, and Memorial
Hospital.
The application of this lesser standard, producing a different re-
sult than the compelling state interest test, was also employed in
another case cited in Osterndorf. In Starns v. Malkerson,8 8 the Su-
preme Court affirmed a lower court's decision that a regulation
promulgated by the Board of Regents of the University of Minne-
sota requiring one year's residency in order to qualify for in-state
tuition was not a violation of the equal protection clause.8 9 The
decision, which the Supreme Court affirmed, stated that the right
to in-state tuition was not a fundamental right like that at stake in
Shapiro.90 Therefore, the exacting standards of the "compelling
state interest" test did not apply. Instead, the district court in
Starns asked whether the statute had some "rational relation to a
legitimate state interest."91 The court decided that the durational
residency requirement satisfied the rational basis test because it
was a "rational attempt by the State to achieve partial cost equali-
zation between those who have and those who have not recently
contributed to the State's economy." 92 However, the court's deci-
sion in Starns was later questioned by the Supreme Court in
Vlandis v. Kline."
In Vlandis, the Supreme Court struck down a Connecticut stat-
ute which created an irrebuttable presumption of nonresidency if a
person listed an out-of-state address in his application to the state
university."" Although the Court struck down the statute on due
process grounds, it stated that "to apportion tuition rates on the
basis of old and new residency . . . would give rise to grave
problems under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."' This footnote, which was cited-by the Osterndorf
87. Sosna, 419 U.S. at 409.
88. 326 F. Supp. 234 (D.C. Minn. 1970), aff'd mem., 401 U.S. 985 (1971).
89. Id. at 235.
90. Id. at 238.
91. Id. at 237.
92. Id. at 240. Compare this with the rejection of the "contribution" rationale expressed
in Shapiro, supra note 49 and accompanying text.
93. 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
94. Id. at 442-43.
95. Id. at 450 n.6.
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court,91 suggests that even when the more lenient "rational basis"
test is applied to a statutory durational residency requirement,
equal protection problems may arise.
Both Sosna and Starns demonstrate the different treatment the
Supreme Court has given durational residency requirements which
do not infringe upon any fundamental right or basic necessity of
life. The Fifth District Court of Appeal in Osterndorf acknowl-
edged this distinction, noting that because the right to an en-
hanced tax exemption was not a fundamental right or a basic ne-
cessity of life, it was to be subjected to the rational basis
standard. 97 The supreme court in Osterndorf, however, did not be-
labor the distinction. 8 Instead, the Osterndorf court followed the
recent Supreme Court decision of Zobel v. Williams.9
In Zobel, two residents of Alaska challenged a state statute
which provided that earnings from the state's mineral fund be paid
to residents based upon the number of years a particular person
had been a resident of the state since 1959.100 Alaska tried to jus-
tify the statute as an attempt to apportion benefits in recognition
of "contributions of various kinds, both tangible and intangible,
which residents have made during their years of residency." 10 1 The
appellants argued that a compelling state interest test should have
been applied to the Alaska statute. On the other hand, the appel-
lees argued for application of the rational basis test. The Supreme
Court stated it did not need to decide if the stricter standard
should be applied because the Alaska statute failed even the "min-
imal [rationality] test."102
The Court in Zobel held that the stated purpose for the Alaska
statute, i.e., to reward citizens for their past contributions to the
state, was not a "legitimate state purpose.""0 In rejecting the
"past contributions" argument, the Court followed Shapiro.1 04
Similar to the reasoning in Shapiro, the Court in Zobel was con-
96. Osterndorf, 7 Fla. L.W. at 555.
97. Osterndorf, 411 So. 2d at 333.
98. Osterndorf, 7 Fla. L.W. at 555. The court reasoned that since the five-year require-
ment failed even the rational basis test, it need not decide if the strict scrutiny standard
would be applicable. For the source of this reasoning, see infra notes 102, 107 and accompa-
nying text.
99. 102 S. Ct. 2309 (1982).
100. 1959 was chosen because that was the year Alaska became a state. Id. at 2311.
101. Id. at 2313 (quoting Williams v. Zobel, 619 P.2d 448, 458 (Alaska 1980)).
102. Id. at 2313, 2315.
103. Id. at 2314.
104. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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cerned about the apportioning of state benefits and services based
upon past contributions to the community. The Court apparently
did not want to open the door to the apportionment of other rights
by allowing Alaska to apportion dividend benefits based on past
contributions. Interestingly, amidst its discussion of apportion-
ment of benefits, the Zobel Court asked: "Could States impose dif-
ferent taxes based on length of residence?"'"" Although this was a
rhetorical question, the context in which the Court posed it sug-
gests that the answer is clearly no.'06
The Osterndorf decision relied heavily upon the reasoning em-
ployed in Zobel. Like the Court in Zobel, the Osterndorf court
stated that it did not need to decide whether to apply the compel-
ling state interest test because the statute failed even the rational
basis test.10 7 The Osterndorf court, like the Zobel Court, also re-
jected the "past contributions" objective of the statute as not be-
ing a legitimate state interest. 0 8 The Osterndorf court apparently
shared the Zobel Court's concern that state benefits might be ap-
portioned based upon length of residence. Such concern by the Os-
terndorf court was particularly focused upon the apportionment of
taxes based on the length of residency.10 9 In addition, like the
Zobel Court,"10 the court in Osterndorf believed that no valid state
interest was rationally served by the distinction made in the stat-
ute between citizens of the state based on the length of resi-
dency." ' Because the Osterndorf court did not want any "second
105. Zobel, 102 S. Ct. at 2314. The Osterndorf court quoted the paragraph in which this
question was asked. See Osterndorf, 7 Fla. L.W. at 555.
106. The Zobel Court inquired whether anything would prevent the state's "contribu-
tion" reasoning from leading to a "sliding scale" for tuition or limiting access to public
facilities or becoming eligible for student loans, civil service jobs, etc. The implied answer is
that nothing would stop such apportionment of state benefits and services. Indeed, a state
could divide its citizens into "expanding numbers of permanent classes." Zobel, 102 S. Ct. at
2315 (footnote omitted). The result could be that these classes would be differentiated for
tax purposes based upon length of their residency. As the Zobel Court stated, "[s]uch a
result would be clearly impermissible." Id. (footnote omitted).
107. Osterndorf, 7 Fla. L.W. at 555. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
108. Osterndorf, 7 Fla. L.W. at 555. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 105, 106 and accompanying text.
110. Zobel, 102 S. Ct. at 2315.
111. Osterndorf, 7 Fla. L.W. at 555. Such belief was expressed in Osterndorf by the
court's statement that there was "no rational basis for distinguishing between bona fide
residents" based solely on length of residency. Id.
The Florida Supreme Court's concern about distinguishing between otherwise bona fide
members of a group can be seen in one of the state cases cited in the court's discussion of
durational residency requirements. In Florida State Board of Dentistry v. Mick, 361 So. 2d
414 (Fla. 1978), the court struck down a statute which imposed a "discriminatory license fee
...on some members of a [dentistry] profession to which all admitted members have al-
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class citizens" in Florida, it declared section 196.031(3)(e)
unconstitutional. 1 12
The dissent in Osterndorf disagreed with the position expressed
in the majority opinion because the dissent believed that the stat-
ute's durational residency requirement did have a rational basis."1 ,
Justice Alderman, writing the dissenting opinion, stated that the
parameters of the rational basis test were recently restated in In
Re Greenberg."4 In that case, the Florida Supreme Court held that
in order to satisfy the rational basis test, the statute need only
bear some reasonable relationship to a legitimate state purpose." 5
That the statute incidentally resulted in some inequality or was
not drawn with mathematical precision, did not make the statute
invalid.11 6 The dissent opined that the legislative purpose of re-
quiring new residents to offset their immediate impact on local
government's capital outlay was a rational basis upon which the
state could base the durational residency requirement." 7 The dis-
sent further stated that Zobel was different than Osterndorf be-
cause the Alaska statute clearly had no rational basis while the
Florida statute did satisfy that standard." 8 However, the dissent
did not explain why there was no rational basis for the Alaska stat-
ute while there was such basis for the Florida statute. Here lies the
weakness of the dissent's treatment of the majority opinion. Be-
cause the majority relied so heavily upon the recent Zobel decision,
the dissent should have explained more precisely why the Alaska
statute differed in such a way as to make Zobel "inapposite" in
deciding the constitutionality of section 196.031(3)(e).1 9
As a corollary of finding the enhanced homestead exemption
granted by section 196.031(3)(e) unconstitutional, the Osterndorf
majority ruled that article VII, section 6(d), 20 of the Florida Con-
stitution did not authorize the Florida legislature to pass a statute
which violated the equal protection clause.' 2 ' In arriving at this de-
ready been deemed qualified." Id. at 416. In that case, the court held that the statute was
unconstitutional because it distinguished among otherwise bona fide members of the group
based upon no apparent purpose or reason.
112. Osterndorf, 7 Fla. L.W. at 556.
113. Id. at 556 (Alderman, J., dissenting).
114. 390 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1980), appeal dismissed, 450 U.S. 961 (1981).
115. Id. at 42.
116. Id.
117. Osterndorf, 7 Fla. L.W. at 556 (Alderman, J., dissenting).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See supra note 14.
121. Osterndorf, 7 Fla. L.W. at 555.
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cision, the court probably considered several principles which were
encompassed within a case which the court considered in its gen-
eral discussion of durational residency requirements. In Sparkman
v. State ex rel. Scott,12 the Florida Supreme Court considered a
statute which required a one-year residency in the state before a
person could qualify for the homestead exemption provided for in
article X, section 7, of the Florida Constitution.12 3 The court ruled
that the statute was invalid because it materially restricted and
altered the provisions of article X, section 7.124 Such a change in
the provisions of the state constitution, by means of legislative en-
actment, would clearly be improper.125 In a similar way, the Os-
terndorf majority believed that section 196.031(3)(e) was materi-
ally different than the constitutional authority which it was
supposed to enact. "The statute in issue, not the constitutional
provision, effectively establishes two categories of permanent resi-
dents for entitlement to homestead tax exemption. 12 6
Because section 196.031(3)(e) was enacted to implement article
VII, section 6(d), of the Florida Constitution, rather than striking
down the whole statute, the Osterndorf court simply excised the
language of that statutory section which went beyond the purpose
of article VII, section 6(d). This meant leaving the statute itself
intact, but striking the durational residency language which said
"for the 5 consecutive years prior to claiming the exemption under
this subsection.' 1 7
The Osterndorf court's decision to excise the durational resi-
dency requirement rather than strike down the whole statute,
raises an interesting point. The Florida Supreme Court has stated
in the past that an invalid statutory provision is not severable un-
less it can be concluded that the legislature would have enacted
the law even without the invalid provision.12 The court in Os-
terndorf does not provide any supporting evidence indicating that
122. 58 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1952). The Osterndorf court actually stated that it did not "need
to apply Sparkman," although a close reading of that case suggests that the Osterndorf
court had Sparkman in mind in ruling that article VII, section 6(d), of the Florida Constitu-
tion did not give authority to the legislature to enact a statute which violated Florida's
equal protection clause. Osterndorf, 7 Fla. L.W. at 555.
123. Sparkman, 58 So. 2d at 431-32.
124. Id. at 432.
125. See State ex rel. West v. Butler, 69 So. 771, 777 (Fla. 1915).
126. Osterndorf, 7 Fla. L.W. at 555.
127. Id. at 556. See supra note 2.
128. Barndollar v. Sunset Realty Corp., 379 So. 2d 1278, 1280 (Fla. 1980); See also State
ex ret. Limpus v. Newell, 85 So. 2d 124, 128 (Fla. 1956).
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the legislature would have enacted the statute regardless of the in-
clusion of the five-year requirement. Perhaps the court did not en-
gage in such a discussion because to do so would be mere specula-
tion. However, the Florida Supreme Court has also stated that a
court cannot vary the intent of the legislature in order to make a
statute constitutional.129 It seems more probable that the Florida
legislature, in passing section 196.031(3)(e), did not intend the en-
hanced homestead exemption to be given to those people who had
been residents for less than five years. Therefore, the Osterndorf
court's excision of the durational residency requirement, leaving
the rest of the statute intact, grants the exemption to a group
which the legislature did not intend to receive the exemption. For
this reason, the Osterndorf court should have invalidated the stat-
ute altogether and thereby let the legislature reenact an exemption
statute consistent with the Osterndorf decision.
Because the Osterndorf court merely excised the durational resi-
dency requirement from the statute, all Florida residents who own
the home in which they live are given the $25,000 tax exemption.
This will mean lower taxes for about 361,000 residents of Flor-
ida.130 However, these residents will not receive refunds for taxes
paid in past years because the Osterndorf court held that its deci-
sion was prospective only.13 1 The court based this decision regard-
ing a refund on Gulesian v. Dade County School Board.3 2 In that
case, the court held that the Dade County School Board did not
have to refund money paid by citizens pursuant to an excessive
millage rate because of the heavy financial and administrative bur-
den which would result to the school board.1 33 The court in Gule-
sian also noted that the excess taxes were levied in good faith reli-
ance on a "presumptively valid" statute." The court in
Osterndorf did state, however, that residents who have filed timely
lawsuits challenging the five-year requirement may receive re-
funds.1 3 5 Therefore, the Osterndorfs will receive a refund.3 6
129. State v. Keaton, 371 So. 2d 86, 89 (Fla. 1979). See Beebe v. Richardson, 23 So. 2d
718, 719 (Fla. 1945). See also Deltona Corp. v. Florida Public Service Comm'n, 220 So. 2d
905, 907 (Fla. 1969).
130. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
131. Osterndorf, 7 Fla. L.W. at 556.
132. 281 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 1973).
133. Id. at 326-27.
134. Id. at 326.
135. Osterndorf, 7 Fla. L.W. at 556.
136. Id. The court remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the refund
which the Osterndorfs should receive. Id.
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In addition to the impact which the Osterndorf decision will
have upon taxpayers who were formerly denied the $25,000 exemp-
tion, the decision may affect some of Florida's other homestead ex-
emption statutes which contain a durational residency require-
ment. As mentioned previously, 13 7 Florida grants enhanced
homestead exemptions to persons over sixty-five, to those who are
.permanently disabled, and for all residents subject to levies by
school districts. Each of these statutes hinges upon a five-year resi-
dency in the state in order to qualify for the exemption. While the
Osterndorf decision probably would not effect the state's right to
grant an enhanced exemption to those over sixty-five or to those
who are permanently disabled,"8 the decision does suggest that the
state cannot distinguish between those who fit these classifications
and have been residents for five years and those who likewise fit
the classifications but have not been residents for five years. In its
February 3, 1983, clarification opinion, the court declined both
parties' request to consider the constitutionality of subsections
(3)(a) and (3)(b) because petitioner Osterndorf had not claimed in
the trial court entitlement to the exemptions provided in those
subsections. Therefore, the court had no jurisdiction to decide the
constitutionality of subsections (3)(a) and (3)(b).1"9 The court also
stressed the fact that the constitutional language on which subsec-
tions (3)(a) and (3)(b) are based is different than the language on
which subsections (3)(d) and (3)(e) rest." "
III. CONCLUSION
Despite the Osterndorf opinion's structural ambiguity, the court
properly ruled that section 196.031(3)(e) established two categories
of permanent residents for tax exemption purposes and that this
classification was without any rational basis. The court was correct
in stating that such "disparate treatment of resident homeowners
cannot be allowed if our equal protection clause is to have any real
meaning.""1 By ruling that the five-year requirement was uncon-
stitutional, the court effectively assured that there will be no "sec-
ond class citizens" in Florida. Such a stance by the court is to be
137. See supra notes 8, 10, 11 and accompanying text.
138. With respect to these classifications, the state has a better argument that there is a
rational basis for these exemptions, i.e., to aid the elderly and disabled who often live on a
low, fixed income.
139. Osterndorf, 8 Fla. L.W. at 58.
140. Id. See supra note 8.
141. Osterndorf, 7 Fla. L.W. at 555.
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applauded. However, the court should not have merely excised the
five-year requirement out of the statute, but should have struck
the statute in its entirety. As the decision stands, local govern-
ments may be significantly affected financially because the decision
allows all resident homeowners to receive a $25,000 enhanced ex-
emption. If the court had struck down the statute in its entirety,
local governments would not be faced with the substantial revenue
losses caused by the decision. The Florida legislature could then
reenact the $25,000 exemption for all residents, if indeed it desired
to grant such an all-inclusive exemption. By approaching section
196.031(3)(e) in this way, the Osterndorf court could have avoided
the problem of second-guessing whether the legislature would have
passed this statute without the five-year requirement. Such an ap-
proach would also have avoided the possible serious tax conse-
quences on local governments while at the same time giving Flor-
ida's equal protection clause the high regard which it deserves.
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